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To what extent and in what arenas do collaborating musicians need to understand
what they are doing in the same way? Two experienced jazz musicians who had never
previously played together played three improvisations on a jazz standard (“It Could
Happen to You”) on either side of a visual barrier. They were then immediately interviewed
separately about the performances, their musical intentions, and their judgments of their
partner’s musical intentions, both from memory and prompted with the audiorecordings
of the performances. Statements from both (audiorecorded) interviews as well as
statements from an expert listener were extracted and anonymized. Two months later,
the performers listened to the recordings and rated the extent to which they endorsed
each statement. Performers endorsed statements they themselves had generated more
often than statements by their performing partner and the expert listener; their overall
level of agreement with each other was greater than chance but moderate to low,
with disagreements about the quality of one of the performances and about who was
responsible for it. The quality of the performances combined with the disparities in
agreement suggest that, at least in this case study, fully shared understanding of what
happened is not essential for successful improvisation. The fact that the performers
endorsed an expert listener’s statements more than their partner’s argues against a simple
notion that performers’ interpretations are always privileged relative to an outsider’s.
Keywords: shared understanding, intersubjectivity, collaboration, communication, interaction, improvisation,
music, jazz
INTRODUCTION
When musicians play together, they predict, perceive, and react
to what their partners do in complex ways. Doing this requires
some level of shared understanding—but of what exactly? In what
arenas and to what extent do collaborating musicians creating a
joint performance need to understand what they are doing in the
same way? And to what extent is their understanding privileged—
more shared—relative to the understanding of a non-performing
listener?
At a minimum (or even by definition) it must be the case that
the musicians agree that music is happening. For most kinds of
music it is also essential that they have overlapping (though not
necessarily fully identical) understandings of a rhythmic struc-
ture, or else no joint performance would be possible. But must
everything be agreed upon? How much discrepancy in under-
standing can there be in a successful joint performance? That is, to
what extent do collaborating musicians agree on every aspect of
musical structure, or their concept of the piece, or each other’s
musical intentions at each moment, or their judgment of the
quality of the performance?
Joint musical performance is, of course, a particular case of
joint action that has its own particular and genre-specific quali-
ties (Keller, 2008), and one could ask variants of these questions
in other domains of interaction. In studying conversation, for
example, one could ask to what extent conversational partners’
mental representations of linguistic and conceptual structure are
identical (e.g., Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Schober, 2005), or to
what extent they understand the activity and agendas of the con-
versation to be the same (e.g., Forgas, 1983; Russell and Schober,
1999), or to what extent they accurately judge each other’s inten-
tions at different moments [whether they accurately recognize
the other’s referring expressions (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Garrod and Anderson, 1987), or the other’s ironic intent or
implied criticism or emotional state (e.g., Ickes, 1993)], or to what
extent they agree in their judgments of whether the conversa-
tion was successful or enjoyable or irritating. In a grand sense all
these questions are related to aspects of partners’ common ground
(Clark, 1996)—their knowledge, beliefs and assumptions about
what they mutually know. But exactly how common ground
builds and what is relevant in conversation clearly differs in musi-
cal interaction, which usually does not have referential content
or the kinds of communicative intention that are found in con-
versations (Cross, in press), even if musical interaction can have
conversation-like back-and-forth structures (e.g., Monson, 1996;
Healey et al., 2005).
The aim in this case study was to explore the extent to which
a pair of experienced jazz musicians understand what they have
done together in the same way: whether they spontaneously
generate the same descriptions of their performances and inten-
tions, and even when they do not, whether they agree with
their partner’s characterization of what happened and what was
intended. The methodological approach was to collect immediate
retrospective accounts by performers after their performances,
and then to examine the extent to which either party later
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endorsed the statements that they themselves and their partner
had made, as well as statements made by an expert listener (see
Gottman and Levenson, 1985; Brown and Pavlicevic, 1996, and
Ickes et al., 1986, for examples of this approach in other domains
of interaction).
Our approach differs from what has been done thus far in
empirical studies of music performance in our explicit focus on
(1) how performers linguistically articulate their understanding
of what has happened musically and on (2) the extent to which
performers agree with each other’s articulations. Behavioral and
neuroscientific observation of musicians playing together (e.g.,
Clayton, 2005; Keller et al., 2007; Goebl and Palmer, 2009;
Kirschner and Tomasello, 2009; Luck and Sloboda, 2009; Pecenka
and Keller, 2009; Keller and Appel, 2010; Novembre et al., 2012;
among many others) can allow inferences about the shared
mental representations (explicit or implicit) underlying joint
performance—for example, how players mentally represent their
partners, what kinds of anticipatory and monitoring mechanisms
must be in effect for coordinated music-making to work, or how
perception of a partner’s motion affects synchronization. But they
do not often get at musicians’ own characterizations of these
mental representations—of their mental life while playing.
Although we interview musicians, our approach also differs in
focus from prior interview studies that analyze musicians’ more
general reflections on, for example, how they feel about their
musical roles (King, 2006), their relationships with other per-
formers (Myers and White, 2012), their sense of empathy in peak
performances (Waddington, 2013), the nature of improvisation
(Sawyer, 1992), or their identity as a musician (MacDonald and
Wilson, 2005). We focus instead on musicians’ detailed accounts
immediately after specific performances because, like Davidson
and Good (2002), we are interested in how performers under-
stand their moment-by-moment collaboration: how they believe
they put forwardmusical ideas, how they hear those ideas as taken
up or rejected, when and if they impute intention to their co-
performers, etc. And we are interested in the extent to which these
understandings are shared.
Rather than examining how the musicians communicate with
each other (e.g., Davidson and King, 2004; Ginsborg and King,
2012), we are interested in exploring players’ musical thinking
independent of their co-performers’ thinking. Of course musi-
cians rehearsing and playing together do talk about the music,
their interpretations, and their roles, and so one would expect (if
the partnership persists) that at least some characterizations of
what has happened musically are likely to become more shared
over time and with more and more conversation (Williamon and
Davidson, 2002). In the current study we focus on one pair’s
initial musical encounter, and we interview them about their
understanding of what happened without allowing them to dis-
cuss their performance at all; in fact, we never let them talk to
each other or even see each other (The situation is thus more
akin to playing with strangers in a recording session booth than
to a musical partnership that develops face to face with the usual
casual and task-oriented conversation that allows musicians to get
to know each other as performers and as social beings).
As we see it, the extent to which co-performers agree or
disagree with each other’s characterizations is likely to vary
substantially in different pairings, different performances, and for
different kinds of statements. We would expect that competent
musicians should agree, given their ear and experience, on basic
musicological facts about what happened—who started the piece,
what key they were in, how many verses or choruses were played
(if it’s that sort of piece), and when their rhythms and tempi
matched or mismatched. But it is less clear whether players will
agree in their evaluations of the quality or flavor of a particular
performance, in their judgment of what their partner meant by
a particular musical gesture, in when the collaboration was more
and less smooth, or in how responsibility is assigned (for exam-
ple, who is leading at any particular moment). As Wöllner (2013)
demonstrated in a string quartet, quartet members who rated (on
a continuous slider) their own and each others’ expressivity while
watching and listening to video of an earlier joint performance
did not necessarily agree with each other, in either direction or
valence (see also Seddon, 2005).
In the current study, we selected the genre of jazz improvi-
sation, and we gave the performers the task of playing a jazz
standard together three times in a row, in a different way of
their choosing each time. Given the genre, we expected that the
performers might afterwards especially talk about the collabora-
tive aspects of improvisation: making offers, picking up on the
other’s gestures or hints, sensing that the partner was ready to
change gears, etc. We also were aware of the possibility that, given
the free flow and interdependence of improvisation, performers
might find it difficult to articulate precise moments when a single
thing had happened or where they hadmade conscious or specific
musical judgments. But our intention in the study was to start
with what the performers themselves thought worth articulating,
and even though we used focused prompts to encourage them to
talk, to try as much as possible to elicit their perspectives on what
they had done.
For the performers’ likelihood of later endorsing each other’s
characterizations, various patterns of results are possible. If both
players independently were to generate all the same statements,
or if they did not but they were to fully endorse all each other’s
statements, this would demonstrate strong intersubjective agree-
ment. If they were to endorse each other’s statements more than
they endorsed an outside listener’s, this would suggest that the
co-performers hold a privileged understanding, perhaps simi-
lar to the way that speakers and addressees in a dialog tend to
understand each other’s referring expressions better than eaves-
droppers do (Schober and Clark, 1989). If players do not later
endorse even the statements they themselves made, this would
suggest that interpretations are fleeting and unstable, whether
because they are not memorable or because understandings
change. If players only endorse some of their partner’s charac-
terizations (while continuing to endorse their own), the extent of
that endorsement and the kinds of statements that they disagree
about should be informative about what kinds of understandings
they share.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The performing participants were a professional jazz saxophon-
ist and a professional jazz pianist who had never previously met.
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Both weremale, one in his 20s and the other in his 30s, and thus of
the same general cohort; both regularly perform inNew York City,
and both are graduates of (different) leading jazz performance
programs. They each were compensated $100 for participating
two times, first on the day of performance and then for a second
phase of data collection.
The outside listener who provided additional characterizations
of the performances was a faculty member at The New School for
Jazz and Contemporary Music (Dan Greenblatt) who has pub-
lished on jazz performance and theory (e.g., Greenblatt, 2004,
2013). He performs professionally and has recorded as a jazz sax-
ophonist, and he has extensive experience on panels evaluating
student performances.
Informed consent for participating and for releasing sum-
mary results was obtained from all participants, and consent
for releasing audio recordings of the performances (available in
Supplementary Materials) was obtained from the performers, fol-
lowing review of the procedure by the New School’s Institutional
Review Board.
MATERIALS
Day of performance
A list of potential pieces for performance was generated consist-
ing of 9 jazz standards that the performers might feel comfortable
improvising with an unfamiliar partner. Tunes were selected in
order to be (a) challenging enough to keep the interest of two
good players through three interpretations; (b) flexible enough
to provide a range of improvisatory options, for example hav-
ing common alternate chord changes and not traditionally being
played in a single standard key; and (c) common enough so that
both performers would have a high likelihood of knowing them
and being comfortable playing them. The list (Here’s That Rainy
Day, Embraceable You, It Could Happen to You, You Stepped Out
of a Dream, How Deep is the Ocean, Green Dolphin Street, Day by
Day, If I Should Lose You, Old Folks) was printed on two sheets of
paper, with the instruction “Please circle the tunes you know well
enough to feel comfortable playing in a duo context with a very
good jazz saxophonist” (or “pianist”).
Audio recordings of the performances were burned to CDs and
immediately provided for presentation to the players on a laptop
during the interviews.
A set of prompt questions and interviewing suggestions was
visible to both interviewer and performer throughout the discus-
sion. A first set of general discussion prompts was intended to
stimulate statements frommemory about the differences between
the performances. A second set of prompts was intended to focus
commentary while listening (potentially multiple times, with
stops and starts controlled by the performer being interviewed)
to the recordings that had just been made. The full set of prompts
is presented in Table 1.
Retrospective rating
A questionnaire was constructed (by both authors) consisting of
statements made about the performances by the players them-
selves in the interviews immediately after the performances (70
by the pianist and 34 by the saxophonist) as well as 64 additional
statements by the expert outside listener. The outside listener’s
statements were made in writing soon after the performances
in response to the same recordings; he had been shown the
prompts used in the interviews with the performers. Of the set
Table 1 | Interview prompts.
General discussion prompts Prompts during listening
How would you describe the differences in the three performances you two just
gave?
What do you think worked and what didn’t?
How did you know what to do next?
What did your partner do that struck you as particularly
interesting or notable?
Did anything strike you as particularly notable about your own
performance?
Were there any moments that you had trouble playing
together? Do you remember when they were?
Can you point at particular musical choices you made that your
partner picked up on? That your partner didn’t pick up on?
Did your partner make particular musical choices that you
recognized while you were playing? That you rejected?
What was the difference in character between these three performances? (Ask if
not already covered by response to first question)
Were there any differences in the quality of performance? (Ask if not already
covered by response to first question)
How easy or hard was it to play with your partner? Why (Please be as specific as
you can)? Did this change over time?
What did your partner do that struck you as particularly interesting or notable?
(Please be as specific as you can, and about in which version)
Did anything strike you as particularly notable about your own performance?
(Please be as specific as you can, and about in which version)
Were there any moments that you had trouble playing together? Do you
remember when they were?
Can you describe, as specifically as possible, how you reached agreement—for
each version—on how to start, how to structure the piece (e.g., improvising or
not, soloing or not, how many choruses), and how to end the piece?
Did you feel that someone was in charge? Did this change during your
performances? Was it different in the different versions? How did you know?
Can you point at particular musical choices you made that your partner picked up
on? That your partner didn’t pick up on?
Did your partner make particular musical choices that you recognized while you
were playing? That you picked up on or rejected?
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of statements, 28 were judged as alternate versions of the same
claim made by two parties, with 12 statements made by all three
parties; for example, the pianist’s “He started the second song,”
the sax player’s “I started playing first” (referring to the second
performance), and the expert’s “Here the sax takes the lead from
the start” were judged to be sufficiently similar to be considered
alternate versions of the same claim. The 28 two-party and 12
three-party statements were summarized in new joint wordings
(e.g., “The sax started this performance”), creating 14 and 4
statements, respectively. One additional statement (“The sax was
more responsible than the pianist for the quality of this take”)
was created as a transformation of the original statement “The
pianist was more responsible than the sax for the quality of this
take.” This procedure resulted in 151 unique statements that
could be rated.
The statements were anonymized and made consistent so that
the original author of the statements could not be ascertained
and to point to the moment in the recording that the performer
was discussing; for example, “I was playing a bass part” was
transformed into “At about 4:08 the sax plays a bass part”; the
statements about the sax player’s starting the second performance
were transformed into “The sax started this performance.” Of
the 151 statements, 114 were specific statements that could only
apply to one performance (e.g., “Just before about 0:28, the
sax was waiting for the piano to play the tonic as a cue to start
the melody”); 33 were generalizable statements—made about
one performance but potentially applicable to any of the three
performances (e.g., “The overall performance was standard
or ‘vanilla’”; “The sax started this performance”); and 4 were
global—general statements about the players and performances
(e.g., “My partner’s signals were very clear”). Although the
outside listener produced a few statements that used particularly
technical musicological language (e.g., “The pianist substitutes at
bar 15-16 (around 0:52) (“down you tumble”) as | F#-7 B7 | F-7
Bb7 | rather than | F-7 | Bb7 | ”; “At about 0:17 the piano changes
the quality to Phrygian, signaling a more functional dominant”),
all three included technical language and jazz-specific terminol-
ogy (see Figures 5A–E for the full set of anonymized statements
with attribution of source).
The questionnaire presented each statement for rating on a five
point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). The
questionnaire consisted of five parts: (a) global statements about
players and performances; (b) generalizable statements that could
apply to more than one performance; (c) specific statements that
concerned just one performance; and (d) questions about the
experience of completing the questionnaire (e.g., “Did you find
yourself remembering how you felt at the time or thinking about
how you feel about things now when listening or a bit of both?”).
For statements in (b), the questionnaire asked participants to rate
the extent to which they endorsed each statement for each of
the three performances (see Figure 1) so that the questionnaire
ended up requiring 217 separate ratings of the statements about
the performances.
The statements in parts (a) and (b) were presented in a ran-
dom order and the questions in part (c) were presented in the
order corresponding to the moments in the recording to which
they applied.
PROCEDURE
Day of performance
Throughout the day, the performers never heard each other’s
names, met each other, saw each other, or heard the other speak;
FIGURE 1 | Start of questionnaire part (b)—generalizable statements that could apply to all three performances.
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they entered and exited and they were briefed and debriefed
entirely separately.
After the performers entered the experiment room, which
was a performance space at the New School for Jazz and
Contemporary Music in New York City, they were seated on
either side of a visual barrier with the piano on one side (see
Figure 2) and then asked to select (on paper) which standards
they would be comfortable performing (see Materials). The
experimenter selected “It Could Happen to You” from those on
the list that overlapped, and then presented instructions to both
performers simultaneously. The performers were asked to impro-
vise three versions of “It Could Happen to You” that should
be different from each other and that should each last about
5min and be separated by silence; the performers were never
to speak to each other at all, neither before, during or after
the performances. The performances were audiorecorded using
the performance space’s high quality microphones and recording
equipment, and immediately burned to CDs (Recordings of the
three performances are available in Supplementary Materials).
Immediately after the performances, each player was inter-
viewed separately by different interviewers (the first author and
a psychology graduate student) about the three performances.
Both interviewers had experience carrying out research inter-
views, musical training, and experience playing in the instrument
group about which they were interviewing (piano or brass) in
other genres, and non-expert levels of experience with jazz per-
formance. Interviews were carried out using the prompts (see
Materials), first soliciting the players’ general observations about
the performances and then their observations prompted by lis-
tening to recordings of the performances. The interviewers’ task
FIGURE 2 | Positioning of pianist and sax player, on either side of a
screen onstage in the performance space.
was to elicit detailed and specific commentary that addressed the
target questions, in whatever way seemed appropriate for each
performer; the interviewers were instructed to be flexible and to
probe further for any statements that could be clearer or more
specific about which moment in the music they were referring to.
For the General Discussion prompts, interviewers were instructed
to probe if players were not forthcoming (“Can you say more?”
“Were there any other differences?” “Did anything else strike
you?” etc.), and to request clarification if a player said anything
the interviewer didn’t understand. For the prompted listening,
interviewers first played each recording the whole way through
before using the prompts to elicit commentary; after that the play-
ers were encouraged to start and stop the recording themselves as
often as they liked to make specific comments in the spirit of the
prompts. The interviewers were encouraged to probe further if
they did not understand which precise moment or section in a
recording the player was referring to. The interviews, which were
audiorecorded for subsequent use, took about one hour each.
Retrospective rating
Two months later, the performers were given access to MP3s of
the three recordings and paper-and-pencil hardcopies of the ques-
tionnaire, for them to fill out at their convenience in a quiet
place alone, without interruption. (The interval of two months
reflected time for questionnaire development, and it was intended
to minimize the risks of both immediate retrospective biases and
long-term forgetting. Other time intervals would, no doubt, cre-
ate different measurement biases). They were instructed to listen
to each recording at least once with headphones before respond-
ing, and that they could listen to each recording, with starts,
stops, and rewinds, as often as they liked in order to provide
accurate ratings. They were told that we were interested in their
responses as they listened to the recordings now, and that this was
not intended to be a memory test of how they felt at the time
of recording. Both performers returned the questionnaires within
a week; they each reported having taken about an hour to com-
plete the questionnaires. The performers at this point were still
uninformed of the other’s identity.
The outside listener also carried out the same ratings. The
questionnaires and materials were identical except for a few
minor necessary modifications of statement wording (e.g., turn-
ing statements that contained “my partner” into two statements,
one about “the sax player” and one about “the pianist”). In
addition, the listener was asked to rate the quality of the per-
formances based on his experience as a jury member for a jazz
conservatory.
Subsequent elaboration
After the retrospective ratings were returned, we followed up
with each player individually for further elaboration on exactly
what each dissented about for the statements on which the play-
ers clearly disagreed (by 3 or 4 rating points). In order to keep
burden to a minimum, participants were offered the possibil-
ity to respond in writing, in a telephone interview, or in person
as they wished given their schedules and preferences. The saxo-
phonist elaborated about his dissents in writing via email, and
the pianist about his dissents in a telephone interview, which was
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audiorecorded and transcribed. We also asked each player to tell
us about his history performing “It Could Happen to You”; both
reported performing it quite frequently in their professional lives.
RESULTS
OVERLAP IN PERFORMERS’ STATEMENTS
To what extent did the players independently generate the same
statements? There was only a small amount of overlap—less than
10%—in the players’ characterizations of what had happened: 8
of the 104 statements made by both players were made “spon-
taneously” by both parties. Each of the 8 statements that both
players generated turned out also to have been generated by the
outside listener. This means that, in fact, there were no statements
that were exclusively generated by only the performers.
We can’t, of course, take the interview material as a reliable
indicator of everything that the players had been thinking; the
interviews were carried out by two different interviewers (so that
they could happen simultaneously and immediately after the per-
formance), and we cannot know whether different interviewers
might have elicited different observations or characterizations.
Nor do we know how differently each player might have char-
acterized the performances on a different occasion even with
the same interviewers. Nonetheless, it is notable that the overlap
was low, given that the prompt questions were uniform. Clearly
what the performers thought worthy of articulating was substan-
tially different, and their (few) overlapping observations were not
unique relative to an outsider.
RATINGS OF STATEMENTS
Specificity of endorsements
Because the 33 generalizable statements allow a within-subjects
comparison of each player’s ratings for the three performances,
we could test whether the patterns of endorsement were spe-
cific to the performances the statements were originally about. As
Table 2 shows, the evidence is that the endorsements were indeed
quite specific; the average level of endorsement was significantly
higher when ratings were about the original performance than
when the same statements were rated for the other performances,
F(4, 60) = 8.60, p < 0.001 (from an ANOVA with performance
and player as repeated-measures factors, and whether the rating
was about the original performance as a between-group factor).
This increases our confidence that the ratings were thoughtful and
the statements specific to the performances and moments to be
rated.
Table 2 | Average endorsement (both players) for generalizable
statements.
Ratings about
Performance 1 Performance 2 Performance 3
STATEMENT ORIGINALLY ABOUT
Performance 1 3.8 2.0 2.8
Performance 2 2.1 4.2 2.3
Performance 3 3.1 3.2 3.8
Ratings about the original performance are in bold.
Endorsing own vs. others’ statements
Both performers endorsed a strong majority—though not all—of
the (anonymized) statements that they themselves had generated
two months earlier. As Figure 3 shows, both performers endorsed
their own statements more often than statements by the outside
listener, and they endorsed the outside listener’s statements more
than the statements by their performing partner. The reductions
in endorsement of the outside listener’s and the partner’s state-
ments were greater for the sax player than for the pianist, who
endorsed nearly as great a percentage of the statements by the lis-
tener (a sax expert) as his own. But the pattern steps down in a
strikingly similar way for both players.
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that part of
performers’ endorsing their own statements was related to their
wanting to be consistent in endorsing statements they recognized
as their own, or in recognizing that they had not made a state-
ment, even though two months had elapsed since the original
interviews and even though the statements had been anonymized.
Nonetheless, the relative ranking of endorsements of the listener’s
and partner’s judgments cannot be accounted for by this feature
of the method.
Agreement between the players
To quantify the extent to which both players agreed in endorsing
or dissenting with statements made by each party, we calculated
Cohen’s kappa to measure inter-rater agreement for all 217 rat-
ings. We also included their agreement with the outside listener’s
ratings as a point of comparison (note that using kappa to test lev-
els of agreement is quite different from the usual usage of kappa
to validate a coding scheme and ratings by testing inter-coder
reliability). Table 3 shows kappas calculated using three ratings
categories: endorsement (4 or 5 on the 5-point scale), neutral (3),
and dissent (1 or 2 on the 5-point scale).
FIGURE 3 | Percent of the 151 statements originally made by
themselves, the outside listener, and their partner that the pianist and
saxophonist endorsed (by selecting 4 or 5 on the 5-point scale).
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A first observation is that by conventional interpretation the
kappas for the players’ ratings indicate only moderate to fair
agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977) or fair to poor agreement
(Fleiss, 1981). How different are these levels of agreement from
what would occur by chance? The kappa statistic is intended to
account for chance agreement, but given that our usage of kappa
is unusual we simulated what chance agreement would look like
for this many raters, statements, and categorizations of statements
by creating two data sets of 217 simulated ratings by three raters.
These data sets included randomly generated integers between 1
and 3 with equal likelihood of occurring, to simulate our three
levels of rating. We then repeated all the kappa comparisons
summarized in Table 3 on these data sets. All kappas using this
procedure ranged between -0.101 and +0.110, with the majority
close to 0. All but two of the kappa values in Table 3 are greater
than 0.110; clearly the agreement among our participants was
greater than chance.
Second, consistent with the endorsement findings (Figure 3),
we see little evidence that the players have privileged agreement
relative to the outside listener: in general kappas were lower
for sax-pianist agreement than for sax-listener or pianist-listener
agreement. Statements made by the sax player generated the high-
est agreement (whether endorsement or dissent) across the board,
while agreement between the sax player and the outside listener
about the listener’s statements was notably low. The sax player
and pianist agreed most about statements about Performance 1,
as did both players with the outside listener. The generalizable
statements elicited higher agreement by all three pairings than
the specific statements. But all in all the level of agreement was
not particularly high.
Because a neutral rating by one party could potentially be
interpreted as (lukewarm) agreement with the other party’s
endorsement or dissent, we also calculated Cohen’s kappa under
this more generous assumption. Table 4 shows kappas calculated
using an alternative set of three rating categories: endorsement
(either both parties rated a statement 4 or 5 on the 5-point scale
Table 3 | Inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s kappa), calculated with three
categories: both endorse, both neutral, both dissent (Categories with
too few statements for kappa to be calculated are not reported).
Number of Sax-pianist Sax-listener Pianist-listener
statements agreement agreement agreement
Overall 217 0.280 0.378 0.320
STATEMENT MADE BY
Saxophonist 62 0.355 0.583 0.282
Pianist 90 0.178 0.311 0.203
Outside listener 50 0.335 0.063 0.203
PERFORMANCE THAT WAS RATED
1 64 0.292 0.547 0.502
2 64 0.269 0.333 0.307
3 85 0.260 0.235 0.158
KIND OF STATEMENT
Specific 114 0.222 0.279 0.095
Generalizable 99 0.315 0.466 0.355
Performers’ levels of agreement with each other are in bold.
or one endorsed and the other was neutral), both neutral, and
dissent (either both parties rated a statement 1 or 2 on the 5-point
scale or one dissented and the other was neutral).
Under this assumption, the kappa levels are notably higher,
by traditional interpretation moving more into the “moderate”
territory, with a few that Landis and Koch (1977) would call “sub-
stantial” (sax-pianist agreement about performance 2 and about
statements by the outside listener, sax-listener agreement on state-
ments by the sax player). In this way of looking at the ratings,
there is now more evidence for privileged agreement among the
players relative to the outside listener, in that there are higher kap-
pas for the players with each other than with the outside listener
overall, for statements made by the outside listener, for statements
about Performances 2 and 3, and for specific (but not general-
izable) statements. Nonetheless, the fact that the sax player and
pianist agreed most about the statements made by the outside
listener and less about the statements that they themselves had
made, and least about statements made by the pianist, is not con-
sistent with a simple version of players’ privileged understanding.
Otherwise, this more generous view of inter-rater agreement is
consistent with the Table 3 view in several ways. Statements made
by the sax player still elicited particularly high agreement between
sax-listener and pianist-expert. The agreement between the sax
player and the outside listener about the listener’s statements was
again notably low. But in this view, the players agreed with each
other most about Performance 2 relative to the others, and there
is less of a difference in how they rated specific and generalizable
statements (although they still agreed more with the expert about
generalizable than specific statements).
Figure 4 presents a closer look at the distribution of the state-
ments about which the players agreed—both endorsing or both
dissenting—and disagreed. (The figure includes ratings of all 151
statements about the original recordings to which each state-
ment referred, but leaves out the ratings for the “generalizable”
statements applied to the other two recordings; ratings for the
Table 4 | Inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s kappa) calculated assuming
that neutral ratings by one party constitute agreement with the
other’s endorsement or dissent (Categories with too few statements
for kappa to be calculated are not reported).
Number of Sax-pianist Sax-listener Pianist-listener
statements agreement agreement agreement
Overall 217 0.501 0.463 0.414
STATEMENT MADE BY
Saxophonist 62 0.543 0.640 0.447
Pianist 90 0.373 0.446 0.304
Outside listener 50 0.662 0.074 0.199
PERFORMANCE THAT WAS RATED
1 64 0.412 0.595 0.554
2 64 0.606 0.510 0.438
3 85 0.480 0.267 0.264
KIND OF STATEMENT
Specific 114 0.500 0.331 0.165
Generalizable 99 0.471 0.556 0.496
Performers’ levels of agreement with each other are in bold.
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FIGURE 4 | Distribution of players’ agreement for the 151 unique
statements. “Perfect agreement” means that both players gave exactly the
same rating (from 1 to 5 on the 5-point scale); “substantial agreement”
means that both players’ ratings differed by only 1 point and they were either
both endorsements or both dissents; “possible agreement” means that one
of the players’ ratings was neutral and the other’s was not, which could either
be seen as agreement or disagreement; and “disagreement” means that
ratings differed by 3 or 4 rating points.
generalizable statements are presented in Figure 6). As Figure 4
demonstrates, the disagreements (as well as the agreements) came
from statements by all three sources (saxophonist, pianist, outside
listener); from statements about each of the three performances as
well as from the 4 global statements (e.g., “My partner listens to a
lot of the stuff that I listen to”) and from statements that were
specific to only one performance and generalizable across per-
formances. The fact that the agreements and disagreements do
not all come from the same source or the same performance sug-
gests that the level of agreement observed here applies generally
across this pair’s entire performance experience, as opposed to
only a particular moment, and that no party’s characterizations
were uniformly endorsable.
Figure 5 presents a yet more fine-grained view of the 151
statements included in each level of agreement, and Figure 6
presents a similar view of ratings of the 33 generalizable state-
ments across the 3 performances. As one can see, statements with
the most disagreement included not only judgments of quality of
one party’s performance (“The pianist’s opening was excellent”;
“The pianist’s chord at about 1:23 didn’t work”) or the ensem-
ble (“This was not the best performance”), but also assessments
of the nature of the collaboration (“During these two choruses
starting at about 1:22 the sax hears and uses the pianist’s substitu-
tions”) and—surprisingly—even basic musicological facts about
what happened (“At about 2:21, the sax started a phrase on
B flat”).
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FIGURE 5A | Statements with perfect agreement where both players endorsed the statement or were neutral.
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FIGURE 5B | Statements with perfect agreement where both players
dissented.
Elaborations about disagreements
Given the generally high level of musicianship in the pair (sup-
ported by the expert listener’s assessment), we were surprised
at some of the statements on which they disagreed, particularly
those about musicological facts. In the individual follow-up with
each player, we asked them to give more detail about their dis-
sents for the 35 statements on which they clearly disagreed with
the other (by 3 or 4 rating points)—28 for the saxophonist and 7
for the pianist. For example, was the sax player’s dissent with “At
about 2:21, the sax started a phrase on B flat” because he disagreed
that this happened at all, that there was a new phrase, that the
phrase started on B flat, or that it happened at 2:21? Depending
on where the dissents originate, we would come to quite different
conclusions about this pair’s shared understanding.
Table 5 presents the full text of the elaborations. Our inter-
pretation is that 7 of the apparent disagreements in rating may
not reflect true disagreement; they may be explainable as actually
being about differing interpretation of the words in the state-
ments, or to suggest more agreement than the rating implied. A
larger number of disagreements (17) strike us as resulting from
differing ideological stances about the nature of intention and
causality in jazz improvisation; these disagreements may or may
not reflect substantive differences in shared understanding during
the course of playing. But a substantial remaining number (11)
seem to reflect true differences in judgment about the quality of
the performances and about who was responsible.
For the elaborations we classified as reflecting possible non-
disagreement, in some cases they seemed to reflect alternate
interpretations of the wording of the statements. For example,
the saxophonist’s disagreement with “At about 1:38 the piano
accompaniment is fragmented, staccato chords in unpredictable
places, some quite dissonant” seems to stem from an interpre-
tation of the word “dissonant” as meaning “not beautiful,” as
opposed to simply a neutral musicological meaning with which
he may well have agreed. Similarly, the pianist’s disagreement
with “This version had the most motion” stems from his sense
of the word “motion” as referring to the overall arc of an impro-
visation, as opposed to a description of tempo or propulsion.
The saxophonist’s disagreement with “During these two choruses
starting at about 1:22 the sax hears and uses the pianist’s substi-
tutions” does not reflect a belief that he never used the pianist’s
substitutions at all during these two choruses, but a regret that
he didn’t do it sooner. Another disagreement (“From about 5:32
the pianist imitated the sax’s short notes”) may well have resulted
from the pianist’s not agreeing that the short notes happened at
5:32, as opposed to their not happening at all or his not having
imitated them.
Another set of elaborations, all by the saxophonist, seem to
reflect a stance that rejects straightforward claims about causal-
ity and the definitiveness of intentions in jazz improvisation—or
at least an ideology about what kinds of claims are appropri-
ate to make in an interview about improvisation. It is unclear
whether these disagreements reflect a real difference in the men-
tal life of the players during the performances. The saxophonist
rejects on ideological grounds the idea of “rules” or “right and
wrong” or “what works and doesn’t” in jazz, as well as any
sense of inevitability about what happens in an improvisation,
while the pianist and expert use terms that suggest that certain
moments worked and others didn’t. He also clearly rejects the idea
that he may have been carrying out musicological analyses while
playing, as this was not part of his conscious experience along
the way.
There are hints in the saxophonist’s elaborations of a more
complicated stance, in that he does assume that moments can
feel “wrong” or “discombobulated”; that there was something to
figure out when he “couldn’t figure it out fast enough”; and he
refers to a “harmonic blueprint” that constrains what players do
in improvisation, despite his resisting the idea of “predetermined
thoughts or plans.” Although his elaborations reflect the avoiding-
blame “yes-and” approach that is essential to improvisation (e.g.,
Berliner, 1994; Crossan, 1998; Weick, 1998), he also is self-critical
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FIGURE 5C | Statements with substantial agreement (ratings different by only 1 point) that both players endorsed.
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FIGURE 5D | Statements with substantial agreement (ratings different by only 1 point) where both players dissented, and statements with possible
agreement (one player’s rating was neutral and the other’s was not).
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 808 | 12
Schober and Spiro Jazz improvisers’ shared understanding
FIGURE 5E | Statements with disagreement (ratings differed by 3 or 4 rating points).
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FIGURE 6 | Players’ ratings of the generalizable statements for all three recordings.
in not having picked up on substitutions quickly enough. And
although he resists endorsing statements that assign intentions or
conscious musicological analysis to any player (including him-
self), he also describes intentional thoughts in the moment of
playing, even if those intentions are fleeting and inconsistent and
subject to revision. But again, these differences in how the play-
ers articulate their relationship with musical intentions may not
reflect a true difference in shared understanding during their
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Table 5 | Elaborations by players on why they had dissented.
Statement About Dissenter Dissenter’s elaboration
performance
POSSIBLY NOT DISAGREEMENT
Throughout this performance, the sax
phrased in a way that made clear that the
next chord was coming.
1 Saxophonist As we were playing each example I let the piano establish the
harmonic progression and chose to follow rather than lead.
Throughout this performance, the sax
phrased in a way that made clear that the
next chord was coming.
3 Saxophonist As we were playing each example I let the piano establish the
harmonic progression and chose to follow rather than lead.
During these two choruses starting at
about 1:22 the sax hears and uses the
pianist’s substitutions.
1 Saxophonist I only disagree here because it took me a little longer than I would
have liked to figure out those substitutions. I don’t remember
“playing” them, but rather fumbling over them at first. I knew
something interesting harmonically was happening, I just couldn’t
figure it out fast enough. Although it is a very simple and very
well-used technique.:)
The pianist gave a cue to end at about
6:00 by using the pedal.
1 Saxophonist . . . it’s hard to make any definitive claims as to what was being done
in an improvisation, but perhaps the use of a pedal was a clue to me
to wrap it up.
At about 1:38 the piano accompaniment is
fragmented, staccato chords in
unpredictable places, some quite
dissonant.
3 Saxophonist What seems dissonant to one person could very well sound beautiful
and melodic to another. Taste is subjective.
This version had the most motion. 3 Pianist The word motion is kind of abstract. . . I was thinking more about the
overall arc of the tune? That means we start in one place and we go
through certain things and then we end in another place, and I
consider that is like a good motion for a whole song. And I think that
Take 3 didn’t have that as strongly as the other ones. . . That’s just a
matter of what we call motion in a tune.
From about 5:32 the pianist imitated the
sax’s short notes.
3 Pianist I didn’t catch that from listening to it right now, I don’t know. It’s kind
of an open part and he plays something but it almost sounds like I
was looking in the wrong spot. . . he’s not really playing the short
notes, I think from what I just heard.
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
Throughout this performance, the sax
played the root of the next chord to cue it.
2 Saxophonist Playing the root throughout would not be something I could see
myself doing. Maybe a for a few measures if there was uncertainty of
what we were actually playing, but since that was not the case here I
don’t think I would have to do that very much.
At about 0:17 the piano changes the
quality to Phrygian, signaling a more
functional dominant.
1 Saxophonist When I’m in the moment, I don’t have the luxury nor the interest to
think to myself “Oh, he went Phrygian there. . . so I’ll play THIS scale.”
It doesn’t work like that for me. If I was able to hear that texture and
react to it in the moment, great but if not great. 0:17 is already in the
past and we’re on to other music.
At about 2.21, the sax started a phrase on
B flat.
1 Saxophonist This seems like a very subjective observation. I could have used a Bb
in my line but who knows if I conscientiously made a move to “Bb.”
At about 2.21 the reason that the sax
started a phrase on B flat was that the
pianist had played a B flat.
1 Saxophonist Again, it’s all subjective. Maybe I did play a Bb off of the piano’s Bb,
but if we were to do this tomorrow I might play another note
altogether.
At about 2:37, the pianist forced a rushed
rhythm that didn’t fit.
1 Saxophonist It’s hard to imagine “rushing a rhythm in to fit.” There was elasticity in
the takes, some more than others but when playing duo like this and
not married to a bass player and/or drummer “time” is all relative.
At about 3:09, the last chord of the solo,
the pianist put a chord in the wrong place.
1 Saxophonist Who is to say what is “wrong” or what is “right”? There is no wrong
or right, there just is. That is JAZZ. Just because it might have been
unexpected does not make it “wrong.”
The sax gave a cue to end at about 5:58 by
playing louder and in F.
1 Saxophonist Again, it’s hard to make any definitive claims as to what was being
done in an improvisation.
The pianist’s chord at about 1:23 didn’t
work.
2 Saxophonist Who’s to say what works and what doesn’t work?
(Continued)
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Table 5 | Continued
Statement About Dissenter Dissenter’s elaboration
performance
At 1:57 to 2:03 the sax plays a
“turnaround” at the end of the melody to
get back to the top of the sax solo.
2 Saxophonist Labeling and analyzing of playing is all and well, but it’s not how I think
when playing. It’s a sound that I will use at the end of a chorus to get
to the top. It may or may not be a “turnaround” but again, who is
making these calls?
At 1:57 to 2:03 because the piano does
not pick up the turnaround, things are a bit
discombobulated between the two
players.
2 Saxophonist If anything, when things seem “wrong” or “discombobulated” it
often is a time for the players to really explore the limits of
improvisation where they are forced to abandon their clichés and licks
and find their way back to calmer waters but it is so hard to say
“wrong.”
At about 2:05 the players find the top
together and are OK again.
2 Saxophonist Tied into [previous elaboration], when improvising in a duo there is
freedom harmonically, melodically, and rhythmically. There are no
“rules” and the players determine when and where to “get off”
without any predetermined thoughts or plan.
At about 2:22 the sax signaled the next
chord by playing a diminished scale and
getting louder and quieter.
2 Saxophonist Again it’s too hard to say for sure that just because a certain scalar
passage was played that it determined or signaled a next chord. Even
when playing in “free” time, if you are playing a “tune” then there is
a certain harmonic blueprint that no matter how you manipulate or
extrapolate it, it is always going on subconsciously in your brain and
regardless of what liberties are taken in the moment, players will
organically gravitate toward moments that they can “ground”
themselves back in.
The sax expected to have accompaniment
during “Fried Bananas.”
3 Saxophonist How can anybody say for sure what another person was expecting or
not? It doesn’t make sense. Since this is all happening on the fly, the
players need to be ready for anything.
At 4:38 the pianist rushed a little bit. 3 Saxophonist I don’t believe that one can “rush” when there is no absolute “time.”
Flexibility in time is what gives improvisation in this context its sense
of freedom.
When it’s rushed, it’s not just the tempo, it
feels rushed.
3 Saxophonist What “feels” rushed to a listening or someone analyzing tapes most
likely doesn’t “feel” the same to the players. In the context of a duo
performance, any player has the authority to change tempos when
and if they feel like it. But since there are no other “time keepers”
(bass or drums) to lock the performers into “tempo,” the time can
rush or slow down at their liking.
At about 4:52 the sax intended to play
another chorus.
3 Saxophonist How can one be so sure that the sax player “intended” to play
another chorus? There have been plenty of times in my performance
career when improvising you decide at the last minute—“Ok, that
was enough. Do I really NEED to play ANOTHER chorus?” Most
often, I decide that I do not need to play another chorus and just get
out of the tune.
From about 6:17 because the piano tried
to change the mode and the sax did not,
there are a few bars that sound
harmonically uncoordinated.
3 Saxophonist More issues with what sounds “right” or “wrong.” When improvising
it may take some time for the players to get on the “same page” but
it is the search and the journey to find where they are going that is the
great joy of improvisation.
DISAGREEMENT IN JUDGMENT AND EXPERIENCE
The pianist’s time feel was rushed. 3 Saxophonist The pianist had a really great time feel throughout each of the three
takes. At no time did I feel he was rushing.
This was not the best performance. 3 Saxophonist I think that I felt that this take was “better” than other takes we did.
The communication in this take was not as
good as it could have been.
3 Saxophonist I felt like communication was great throughout each of the three
takes. That’s the beauty of using your ears and playing through
improvisation.
When the pianist played in the same range
as the sax at about 1:37, the pianist was
stepping on the sax’s toes.
1 Saxophonist I felt that the pianist was very tasteful throughout and at no time felt
like my toes were being stepped on. Even in the same range. If
anything, it created a unique texture that is often overlooked because
of the range of the piano.
(Continued)
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Table 5 | Continued
Statement About Dissenter Dissenter’s elaboration
performance
When the pianist played a solo line over
the sax from 1:53 to 1:59, the pianist was
stepping on the sax’s toes.
1 Saxophonist Again, to me I did not feel like my toes were being stepped on
throughout the recording.
The pianist’s continuation of the sax’s
phrasing at about 2:55 was “stepping on
the sax’s toes.”
2 Saxophonist There was no stepping on the sax player’s toes.:)
This performance was the most enjoyable
of the three.
3 Pianist Overall communication there were the most things happening that
were not together. . . Everybody was expecting the other guy to do
something else the most times out of all the three takes. . . the first
two takes were much better in that sense.
This version took the most harmonic
liberties.
3 Pianist Take 2 was the one with the most harmonic liberties, because it was
free of form, it was out of time. . . more than the first and third take as
far as the harmony involved.
The sax was more responsible than the
pianist for the quality of this take.
3 Pianist About the saxophone. . . I’m saying he wasn’t the one leading. . . I
started playing by myself, I was expecting him to go certain places
and. . . he didn’t go to some of them but I think. . . I couldn’t expect
him to follow me in that sense. But the idea of me leading the take is
more true than my following him.
In the last phrase the sax played, the sax
was “fishing” to get out of the tune.
2 Pianist When you say somebody’s fishing for the ending that means. . . that
it’s not together and they are not sure where they are or what’s
supposed to happen but from what I heard that sound is really clear.
But on the other hand I think I was kind of leading/forcing. . . that sort
of ending and he was kind of following what I was doing. . . that
particular phrase at least was more him following my harmony.
The pianist’s opening was excellent. 3 Pianist In general I tend to judge and criticize myself a lot so. . . I don’t like to
hear “excellent” along with my intro. . . . I had this idea in mind to play
one chorus by myself, and then the other guy is going to play a
chorus, and we’re kind of going to trade choruses. But he didn’t come
in on the second chorus and it’s kind of obvious because there
weren’t a lot of chances of his predicting exactly that. That’s a pretty
far out thing to predict when you’re not talking or seeing. I think that’s
why I cannot say it was excellent because I could either have made it
more obvious for it to work or think of a different idea. It’s not about
what I’m actually playing for the first chorus when I’m playing by
myself. I jumped right into the song, it’s not a real intro actually.
performance, but rather a different stance on how one talks about
jazz improvisation.
Perhaps more telling are what seem to be real disagreements
in judgments about the performances and their experience. The
players clearly disagree about the quality of Performance 3 on
several fronts. The pianist found it to be the least successful per-
formance, while the saxophonist liked this performance best and
found it most interesting and liveliest. The saxophonist consid-
ered Performance 3 to have taken “harmonic liberties” while the
pianist considered it not to have, and the saxophonist consid-
ered the players’ communication during Performance 3 to have
been successful, while the pianist thought that they had not been
together and that “everybody was expecting the other guy to do
something else.” The pianist considered himself more responsi-
ble for what he found didn’t work in Performance 3, for example,
attributing the fact that the saxophonist did not come in as the
pianist had expected at the end of his opening chorus to his not
having provided clear enough signals; in contrast, the saxophonist
did not rate the pianist as more responsible for the quality of the
performance. More generally, the saxophonist outright rejected
the pianist’s self-criticisms, in particular the pianist’s statements
that he had been “stepping on the sax’s toes” and that he had
been rushing, and considered the overlapping-register moves by
the pianist to have “created a unique texture.”
Intriguingly, the saxophonist assumes that the statement about
the pianist’s part feeling rushed must have come from an out-
sider rather than his partner, reflecting an implicit theory that
co-performers will share judgments that outsiders do not. But this
statement turns out actually to have been made by the pianist.
As we see more generally, the data do not support privileged
understanding between the players, relative to this outsider.
DISCUSSION
FINDINGS AND METHOD
Taken together, the findings suggest less than fully shared under-
standing between these two performers. Immediately after the
performances they did not generate many of the same statements
to characterize what had happened in their performances and
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 808 | 17
Schober and Spiro Jazz improvisers’ shared understanding
how they had experienced them—in fact, there were no state-
ments that they both generated that the outside listener didn’t
also generate. Two months later, their endorsement of the
other’s (anonymized) statements was notably less than their
endorsement of their own or the outside listener’s statements.
Quantitatively, their agreement with each other’s ratings (kappa)
was better than chance, but at best moderate and only occa-
sionally substantial if one takes a generous interpretation of
“agreement.” And their agreement with each other was not strik-
ingly greater than with the outside listener, suggesting that they
did not share privileged understanding relative to this listener.
How important are these differences? In one sense, the extent
of agreement that we found could be seen as impressively high
relative to the radical difference that could have been observed;
the ways that the ratings differ could be seen as providing a
profile of each player’s relative weighting or valuing of charac-
terizations that they both agree with overall. In another sense,
the differences can be seen as more substantial. Focusing on
differences in judgment of the performances (as opposed to ide-
ological or stylistic differences in talking about improvisation,
or differing interpretations of terms in the statements), the per-
formers differed substantially in their judgment of the quality of
one of the performances (Performance 3). They expressed dif-
ferent judgments of responsibility for what had happened and
especially who was leading; they had different musicological judg-
ments about the harmonic freedom of that performance, and they
expressed differences in relative enjoyment of the performances.
In our view, the overall level of agreement and the particular sites
of disagreement combine to demonstrate that substantial differ-
ences in understanding can occur in improvisation of the quality
observed here.
The ideological differences in talking about improvisation
were also notable: how intentions were described and assigned,
whether one party could be assigned responsibility for what hap-
pens jointly, and how much is “predetermined.” It is unclear
whether this reflects real differences in mental life or experi-
ence while playing, as opposed to varying judgments about what
was appropriate to say in this interview setting; in the contin-
uum from “anything goes, no right or wrong” to “not everything
goes” discourse, the two players clearly fall in different places.
Nonetheless these different orientations suggest different levels of
comfort with assigning responsibility and attributing causality in
jazz improvisation.
Of course, this case study included only one pair of performers
and one outside expert listener, and they played in a particu-
lar setting without seeing each other (more like in a recording
studio than in many rehearsal and performance venues). How
and whether these findings would replicate with other perform-
ers in the same genre, performers of different ages or different
musical or cultural backgrounds, performers on different instru-
ments, or performers in different genres, and with outside lis-
teners with different expertise, is unknown. And whether the
findings would look different if the performers could have seen
and talked with each other, and thus relied on visual and con-
versational cues in both the content of their interviews and in
making their later judgments, is also unknown. But the method
used here—immediate retrospective recall, subsequent ratings of
those judgments (one’s own, other players’ and listeners’), and
further probing about those judgments—could easily be applied
to these other situations.
The method combines the advantages of quantified compar-
ison that identifies overall patterns with qualitative focus on the
content of performers’ experience. We of course do not believe
that the statements collected under this method represent a pure
or full account of these musicians’ mental lives during their
performance (as with any retrospective recall; see Ericsson and
Simon, 1993). Interviews are complex interactive events (see, e.g.,
Clark and Schober, 1992; Conrad et al., 2014, among many oth-
ers), and we do not imagine that the statements analyzed here are
necessarily the same as what our performers might have said with
other interviewers, or that players’ reports even immediately after
a performance are direct readouts of their mental life.
In fact, we suspect that further probing of the agreed-upon
statements might reveal further disagreements—the kinds of
“undetected conceptual misalignments” (Schober, 2005) that are
a part of ordinary language use (see also Suessbrick et al., 2000).
Because conceptual misalignment is likely to be inherent in a
method that focuses on the aspects of performers’ mental lives
that can be articulated linguistically, we see the further probing
after ratings as essential to the method. We should also note that
themethod requires particularly attentive and articulate perform-
ers who are willing to reflect on their musical practice, as well
as to engage in a complex set of tasks and materials on mul-
tiple occasions. We were fortunate that our performers were so
thoughtful, so musically able, and so willing to give our unusual
performance situation a try; but we suspect that there is a range
of articulateness and willingness across performers, and that this
method may be suitable for only a subset of performers. We were
also fortunate in our outside listener’s thoughtfulness and verbal
fluency, but we are aware that listeners are likely to range enor-
mously in their ability to listen or articulate in such an informed
and thoughtful way.
Despite all these caveats, the interviews, ratings and subse-
quent probings from this method do create an account of per-
formers’ mental life, and we propose that they allow new insights
into musicians’ shared understanding.
FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT SHARED UNDERSTANDING
Our approach allows us to begin addressing a larger set of
questions about shared understanding and the mental processes
involved in coordinating musically. As we see it, there is a range
of possibilities for how performers’ understandings overlap. At
the extreme individualist end of the spectrum, players follow
their own script (notated or improvised) and simply happen to
be playing at the same time as the others. The ensemble works
because the players are following a shared (or close enough to the
same) rhythmic structure, but there would be little else that they
need to share in order to manage to coordinate. At the extreme
collaborative end of the spectrum, all players are fully aware of—
tracking—every gesture by the others, and they initiate each of
their ownmusical gestures as a response to the others’ gestures. By
definition, then, every sounding of each players’ notes is a collab-
orative act, and intentionally so. The overlap of understanding at
all levels—musical, conceptual, intentional—would be complete.
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The reality must be somewhere in between, and probably
ranges between the extremes at different moments within an
ensemble performance. There is also likely variability in which
end of the spectrum different musicians are on, and for differ-
ent pieces and playings and genres. As Keller (2008) outlines, how
players allocate cognitive resources and divide attention between
their own performance and others’ inmusical collaboration needs
much more elaboration: how they anticipate, monitor, and adapt
or adjust to their partners. We propose that attention to perform-
ers’ conscious mental life—how they understand their own and
their partners’ intentions and gestures during performance—is
an important piece of this story, in the spirit of Schütz’s (1951)
proposals.
Attending to performers’ mental life is likely to raise new
and complex questions about the nature of responsibility and
causality in interdependent music-making, as co-performing is
simultaneously an individual and collective process (and impro-
visation is more collective than presumed by many, as Cook,
2004, argues). There may be tension between the all-accepting
“yes-and” approach needed to allow improvisation and the more
judgment-based stance of monitoring oneself, one’s partners,
and the ensemble for taste, technical abilities and limitations,
accuracy and direction; musical gestures in an ensemble may
have unintended effects depending on partner uptake, and those
effects can be desirable or undesirable from the originator’s per-
spective. And the nature of partner monitoring and the mental
processes underlying it are less well understood than they need
to be, just as they are less than fully understood in linguis-
tic interaction (e.g., Schober and Brennan, 2003). Players must
have some sort of ongoing partner monitor and they must gen-
erate some sorts of expectations about what their partner will
do, or else they would always assume that the other’s bloop-
ers or missteps were fully intended; but how elaborate and
full-fledged this monitor is unknown, as is how it waxes or
wanes, how it depends on familiarity with the partner and the
piece, etc.
Attending to performers’ mental life also raises new questions
about the nature of shared understanding. One question is about
the extent to which their overlapping judgments rise to the level
of full mutual knowledge or common ground—that is, judgments
that musicians not only both hold but know that their partners
hold (see Clark, 1996, for extensive discussion of the complexities
of mutual knowledge). Our inter-rater agreement provides evi-
dence on overlap of judgments rather than on mutual knowledge
about those judgments, which is a different question. Another
question is how judgments of the sort we have collected relate to
the other kinds of judgments players make about each other and
the full construction of social context that improvisation requires
(Monson, 1996).
Beyond the obvious questions of whether and how these find-
ings replicate in a larger sample of pairs of jazz improvisers
playing different versions of this or another standard, or in larger
ensembles, we see a number of further questions and testable
hypotheses:
• Does understanding align differently in pairs or ensembles
with different degrees of overlap in their cultural and musical
background? Would players from different generations or jazz
performance communities have less shared understanding?
• How does familiarity or experience with a partner affect
shared understanding? Do longstanding pairs or ensembles
have greater shared understanding than new groups, from
years of communicating with each other in rehearsals and per-
formances? Are ensembles with greater shared understanding
more likely to persist as ensembles, along the lines inferable
from Murnighan and Conlon’s (1991) findings about string
quartets that stay together over time?
• Do players share less understanding in improvisations that are
seen as less collaboratively successful?
• How stable or variable is accuracy of understanding a musi-
cal partner’s intentions, and how partner-specific? Are some
players better at sharing understanding with more partners?
Do more musically advanced players (independent of the suc-
cess of their collaborations) knowmore about what the other is
thinking, and are they more likely to agree on what happened?
• Does shared understanding differ across musical genres? Is it
greater or less in more freely improvised music? With notated
music, how do players’ expectations about what an ideal part-
ner would do or ought to do (based on the notation) affect their
judgments?
• How do players’ musical goals—discovery or enjoyment, as
opposed to preparing for performance or perfecting—affect
shared understanding? During a phase of exploring options,
are understandings likely to be more or less shared?
• Is shared understanding greater when performers play together
live, and can thus affect and react to each other’s gestures, than
when they play with a recorded track? Is shared understand-
ing better when players can see each other (see Schober, 2006;
Duffy and Healey, 2012)?
• How is players’ shared understanding more or less privileged
relative to listeners with more and less expertise as performers
or as listeners, or with musical experience in genres other than
that of the performance?
• Does keeping better track of one’s partner’s intentions lead to
better performance? To what extent does too much focus on a
partner’s intentions distract from high quality music-making?
Variants of all of these questions can also be asked in other
domains of joint action, which are likely to have different dynam-
ics depending on the medium of interaction (Clark and Brennan,
1991) and the nature of the joint task at hand—dancing, co-
writing, conversing, walking. Perhaps surprisingly, these ques-
tions have not been extensively explored even in the most fre-
quently studied domain of joint action, conversation, in which
the empirical focus has been more on conversational processes,
the mental representations underlying them, and what leads to
task success than on the extent to which participants under-
stand the interaction and task outcome (successful or not) in the
same way.
Despite the many remaining open questions, we believe this
case study allows a few substantive conclusions. The quality of the
performances combined with the disparities in agreement suggest
that, at least in this pair, fully shared understanding of what hap-
pened was not essential for successful improvisation. And the fact
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that the performers endorsed an expert listener’s statements more
than (many of) their partner’s argues against a simple notion
that performers’ interpretations are privileged relative to an
outsider’s.
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